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Abstract 
 
 
    Despite numerous reform efforts over the past 30 years, acquisition programs in 
the Department of Defense (DoD) continue to experience cost overruns and schedule 
delays.  One contributing factor is the decision-making process used by defense officials.  
The General Accounting Office (GAO) has stated that ‘poor program outcomes are the 
lack of widespread adoption of a knowledge-based acquisition process within DoD 
despite polices that support such a process.  A knowledge-based business case at the 
outset of each program would alleviate overpromising on cost, schedule, and 
performance and would empower program managers.’   
Effective decision-making for acquisition programs is very important.  It not only 
affects the performance of a program but could also impact the lives of Airman, Soldiers, 
Sailors, and Marines protecting our country.  Analyzing decision support products is one 
method to improve the knowledge used during the decision-making process.  Therefore, 
the scope of this research focused on knowledge products supporting decisions made by 
DoD acquisition officials and their alignment with best practices and their usefulness to 
decision-makers.   
This research found that the required information contained in decision support 
products is not adequate to provide the knowledge needed to make informed decisions.  
Recommendations for improving decision support for key knowledge areas will be 
discussed.  
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KNOWLEDGE-BASED DECISION SUPPORT IN DOD ACQUISITIONS 
 
Chapter I.  Introduction 
 
 Changes in the acquisition process in the Department of Defense (DoD) have 
been on-going over the course of the past three decades.  The problem, however, is that 
most reforms that have been implemented have largely been unsuccessful (Friedman, 
2009).  The reasons for the failure of acquisition reform are complicated and are due to 
many different factors.  Despite these reform efforts, many programs are still being 
completed behind schedule and with substantial cost overruns.  Even worse, the 
acquisition process within the DoD has actually become less consistent (Dawn et al., 
1998).  The end-result is an acquisition system that is facing greater problems and 
resulting in even more wasted resources for the United States military (Gill, 2001). 
 One problem that exists for the DoD is that the acquisition process is largely 
based on external influences as opposed to a genuine knowledge-based approach to 
acquiring new systems and materials (Ignols and Brem, 1998).  What is needed for the 
DoD acquisition community is to ensure that the right knowledge is captured at key 
decision points to determine the most effective means by which to acquire new weapon 
systems.  Therefore, this research is designed to investigate what is occurring within the 
DoD acquisition decision-making process.  It is these decisions (most of which are made 
early in a program’s life-cycle) that are causing less than ideal results with regard to 
weapon system programs being behind schedule, over budget, and at times not 
performing as planned.   
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Background 
 
 In its most basic form, knowledge-based decision-making is simply the process of 
collecting and using data and information to gain knowledge that can be used to make 
informed decisions (Fay, 2007).  This process can be a powerful tool in which 
organizations utilize the synthesis of data and information that will lead to making better 
decisions.  Although used by both public and private sector organizations, there are 
differences in the ways in which they utilize this process.  The differences are normally 
attributed to the role that these organizations play in society.  However, although 
recognized, the influence of the context in which knowledge-based decision support is 
made is largely unexplored (Papadakis and Barwise, 1998).   
 In the private sector, through market research, companies use knowledge-based 
decision support primarily to make predictions about customer behaviors and 
expectations.  They then attempt to meet those behaviors and expectations with products 
and services.  Companies in the private sector collect large amounts of data about their 
customers and even the customers of competing companies to understand their needs and 
desires (Doukidis, Mylonopoulos & Pouloudi, 2004).  In other words, most companies in 
the private sector do not make decisions until they have collected large amounts of data 
about the people they serve.  Then, the decisions made by everyone from company 
executives to front-line personnel are based on the knowledge that is gained from 
analyzing the collected data (Vercellis, 2009). 
 For the private sector, an entire industry exists of companies that do nothing more 
than collect and analyze data about customer actions, behaviors, and attitudes.  
Corporations in the private sector typically only make decisions once they have taken the 
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time to analyze the data and understand how they can best respond to their customers, as 
well as meet the needs of potential customers to win their loyalty and business (Jones, 
1998).  The private sector has embraced the concept of knowledge-based decision-
making because it provides a means of having a strong foundation from which to operate 
and from which to determine what changes are needed for the future.   
 The public sector, however, seems to use the concept of knowledge-based 
decision-making in a slightly different way as compared to the public sector.  Public 
sector organizations, from the federal government to the state and local levels, use 
knowledge-based decision-making as a way to determine outcomes from the way in 
which money and other resources are used in relation to policy initiatives (Metcalfe, 
2006).  In some respects, the use of knowledge-based decision-making seems to occur 
more often after resources have been used as opposed to before.  For example, data is 
often collected with regards to how additional spending for education initiatives have 
impacted test scores, or how many people are provided access to health care services 
because of additional spending to open free health clinics.   
 Most public sector organizations, especially at the federal level, are often large 
and complex.  Since the process of knowledge-based decision-making is largely 
dependent upon the size and complexity of an organization, it can be hard to implement 
in the public sector (Miller & Berger, 2003).  This provides some understanding of why 
public sector organizations appear to use the concepts of knowledge-based decision-
making in a different way as compared to the private sector.  This is certainly true in 
terms of the federal government in which actions and initiatives must be taken for 
millions of people in different locations and with a variety of different needs.  However, 
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once a decision is made, then data can be collected about the outcomes resulting from the 
resources that were used.  This knowledge is used to determine if the return on 
investment with regard to the resources that were expended is favorable, which leads to 
better decision-making in the future. 
 Regardless of the sector in which it is used, the underlying principle for 
knowledge-based decision-making is the transfer of knowledge to a group of people or an 
organization to increase the knowledge that exists about a specific situation, clients, or 
work processes (Srikantaiah & Koenig, 2008).  Additionally, the result of this process is 
that knowledge has been gained by the organization in question and decisions are based 
on actual information and data instead of personal opinions or perceptions.  The ultimate 
benefit is the ability to make decisions based on known conditions that positively impact 
an organization (Salas & Maurino, 2010).  This positive impact will allow organizations 
to better respond to the conditions that exist as opposed to simply trusting that the 
decisions that are made will meet the needs of the organization.   
 
Research Problem 
 
There is a lack of the adoption of knowledge-based decision-making within the 
DoD acquisition process.  The acquisition process takes into consideration many forms of 
information products regarding programs both by federal statute and DoD regulation.  
However, the milestone decisions based on these information requirements have not 
translated into better program outcomes.  Additionally, milestone decisions are normally 
made when all statutory and regulatory information requirements are satisfied and not 
based on when critical technology, design, and manufacturing knowledge is attained.  As 
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a result, DoD acquisition programs continue to experience problems with both increased 
cost and schedule and the degradation of performance and quality.    
 
Research Objective 
 
To address this problem, DoD acquisition officials require improved decision-making 
information at key program junctures that capture all program goals, objectives, and 
concerns to facilitate better knowledge-based decisions.  Therefore, the objective of this 
research is to assess the use of knowledge-based decision support in the DoD acquisition 
process.  To address this objective, the research attempted to answer the following 
investigative questions. 
1. What are the critical pieces of information that are required for an informed 
decision at key decision points in the acquisition process? 
2. How does the currently available information (contained in required decision 
products) compare to what is needed for decisions with regard to technology, 
design, and production knowledge for each of the key decision points in the 
acquisition process? 
3. What is the effect of this lack of information on DoD acquisition programs?   
 
4. Can this effect be quantified in terms of cost, schedule, and performance? 
 
Methodology 
 
 To help answer these investigative questions, a secondary data source was 
examined and compared with the knowledge required by either federal statute or DoD 
regulation at key decision points.  Both entities were also compared with knowledge-
based decision-making best practices identified through the literature review.  The data 
consisted of responses from senior-level Air Force acquisition officials interviewed by 
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the Air Force Acquisition Chief Process Office regarding the acquisition decision-making 
process.  These interviews helped identify data products used during decision-making and 
how those products influenced decisions at key milestones.  After summarizing the 
interview data using descriptive statistics, data reduction was accomplished using 
Microsoft Excel software to perform content analysis and identify themes represented 
within the interview data.  This facilitated the comparison of the data with required 
knowledge and best practices used with knowledge-based decision-making during the 
acquisition process.  
 
Thesis Outline    
 
In the chapters that follow, the findings of the in-depth literature review, research 
methodology and analysis, and results will be presented.  The study will establish if the 
intention and usefulness of required information at key decision points in acquisition 
programs provides sufficient knowledge to facilitate more informed decisions.  It will 
examine if key decisions are made at the appropriate time within the defense acquisition 
process.  The literature review in Chapter II will provide the context of the DoD 
acquisition process, the information required by federal statute and DoD regulation, and 
best practices with regard to knowledge-based decision-making.  Additionally, it will 
provide a comparison of knowledge-based decision-making in the private and public 
sector.  In Chapter III, the methodology and research design will be discussed; this is 
followed by an analysis of the data in Chapter IV.  The final chapter will answer the 
research questions and provide recommendations for improving knowledge-based 
decision-making in DoD acquisition programs.   
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Chapter II.  Literature Review 
 
 To focus this research effort on the knowledge required to make decisions for 
acquisition programs at key decision points in the Department of Defense (DoD) 
acquisition process, the literature review is divided into three parts.  The first is an 
examination of the differences in the acquisition practices in the public and private sector.  
The second offers a baseline for the statutory and regulatory knowledge requirements of 
the DoD acquisition system at key milestones.  Finally, the third section reviews studies 
regarding best practices of knowledge-based decision support. 
 
Acquisition Practices:  Military versus Private Sector   
 
 There are some notable differences in terms of how acquisition efforts work 
within the DoD and similar efforts in the private sector.  Some of these variations are 
primarily due to the differences in organizational goals.  Ferguson and DeRiso (1994) 
completed a detailed study of software acquisition efforts between the DoD and the 
private sector in terms of defining program requirements, selecting a contractor (i.e., 
source selection), test and evaluation, and the development process.  Although their 
research dealt primarily with software acquisitions, the findings are applicable to the 
acquisition process of traditional weapon systems.      
Defining Program Requirements 
 In terms of defining the requirements for a system, the DoD generates 
requirements based on the needs of an operational user.  This requirements generation 
process, called the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), is 
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focused on identifying requirements for weapon systems for the entire DoD as opposed to 
the individual services (CJCSI 3170.01G, 2009).  However, in a 2008 study, the General 
Accounting Office (GAO) found that the process has yet to be effective in this manner.  
According to the report, nearly 70 percent of the requirements were sponsored by the 
individual services as opposed to the joint community (GAO, 2008).  Additionally, it 
noted that nearly almost all of these requirements were approved.  As a result, there has 
not been any notable fiscal efficiency gained through the JCIDS process.  In fact, the 
remaining costs of major weapon systems have increased significantly since JCIDS was 
implemented.  Figure 1 depicts the cost remaining versus the annual investment 
appropriations. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Cost Remaining versus Annual Investment Appropriations (GAO, 2008) 
 
 A critical factor within the requirements generation process is the time it takes to 
validate a requirement.  In the aforementioned report, the GAO (2008) found that the 
average time to validate a DoD requirement was 10 months.  In the private sector though, 
it is not unusual for companies to validate requirements on a quarterly basis (Bate and 
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Roberts, 2002).  The responsiveness associated with validating a requirement can mean 
the ability to respond to a threat or beating a competitor to market with a new product 
(Dasarathy, 1985).    
Accurately capturing key system requirements early in the acquisition process has 
a direct impact on the outcome of a program.  However, a preponderance of DoD 
acquisition programs fail to do so.  As a result, most of these programs changed key 
system requirements after the start of development.  These changes translated into 
increased costs and schedule delays (GAO, 2010).  In an attempt to reduce changes in 
requirements, the DoD issued a change in policy requiring programs to hold 
configuration steering boards to make certain that the effect of cost and performance are 
considered when making major technical adjustments (GAO, 2010). 
Source Selections 
 Another key difference between the DoD and private sector is the communication 
with vendors prior to source selection.  Within the DoD, the involvement of vendors and 
contractors is often avoided until a specific vendor or contractor has been chosen, thus 
reducing the sharing of information and knowledge that is used in the decision-making 
process.  In the private sector, vendors and contractors are encouraged to become 
involved very early in the process to leverage their knowledge and information (Ferguson 
and DeRiso, 1994).     
 In terms of vendor or contract selection, the DoD typically operates by requiring 
vendors or contractors to compete against each other, rather than collaborate to combine 
knowledge sets and abilities to win a contract as a unified team.  The selection of a 
vendor or contactor also relies on a very specific set of standards that cannot be changed 
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or deviated from in any way.  If any of the source selection metrics created in advance is 
not met by a particular vendor or contractor, the vendor or contractor is often removed 
from the selection process without any consideration regarding whether their knowledge 
set might be useful for the project.  Again, this is different from acquisition efforts in the 
private sector in which vendors are typically allowed to work together in order to obtain 
the highest level of knowledge and ability from those that can best serve the project.  
Private sector vendor or contractor selection also has a selection process that is much less 
stringent and allows for more flexibility based on the recommendations and information 
obtained by the source selection team (Ferguson and DeRiso, 1994).  Table 1 shows the 
differences in vendor selection in the private sector and the DoD. 
 
Table 1.  Best Practice – Vendor Selection (Ferguson and DeRiso, 1994) 
 
Test and Evaluation 
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Test and evaluation is the next key knowledge area explored in this research.  
Like the DoD, leading private sector firms have dedicated test organizations for new 
products.  However, in general, these organizations are aligned under the program 
manager and testing is often performed in a single facility by the same team members 
(Ferguson and DeRiso, 1994).  The DoD conversely uses independent organizations to 
test systems (DoD Test and Evaluation Guide, 2005).  As such, there is opportunity for 
gaps in knowledge transfer.  Additionally, the GAO (2010) found that programs are not 
testing prototypes that are production representative before committing to production.  In 
doing so, the maximum benefit of test and evaluation is not realized due to the possibility 
of changes to the design after production.  Figure 2 shows the GAO findings with regard 
to the number of programs testing a production representative prototype before and after 
a production decision. 
 Perhaps the biggest difference in test and evaluation is that the private sector 
makes less of a distinction between developmental and operational testing (Ferguson and 
DeRiso, 1994).  The reason is two-fold:  first, by the time the private sector makes a 
decision to field a new product, the technology is proven.  Second, the cycle time in 
product development is typically much longer in the DoD.  Therefore, more technical risk 
is assumed early in the life-cycle while anticipating that the technology readiness level 
will mature.   
11 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Testing of Production-Ready Prototypes (GAO, 2008) 
 
Development Process Requirements 
Another notable difference between the acquisition process within the DoD and 
the private sector can be attributed to the rigidity of the process for product development.  
Strict requirements imposed by Congress and the DoD are inflexible and largely based on 
a single project, rather than understanding existing systems and the impact of future 
projects that may be implemented.  In essence, a large part of the acquisition process is 
focused on following the process itself and not on how knowledge can be applied to 
making more informed decisions (Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment, 2006).  
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Knowledge Requirements of the Defense Acquisition Process 
 
 The DoD acquisition process exists to provide a secure and supportable military 
to maintain our national security strategies (Defense Acquisition Guidebook, 2009).  The 
process is governed by the Federal Acquisitions Regulation (FAR) and implemented by 
DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5000.02.  The DoDI 5000.02 provides the framework in which a 
program progresses throughout its life-cycle.  Figure 3 illustrates the life-cycle 
framework view of the acquisition process.  In addition to the decisions at Milestones A, 
B, and C (which authorize entrance into the major program phases), there are three other 
key decision points within this framework that must be made by the Milestone Decision 
Authority (MDA) (Young, Grimes, and McQueary, 2008).  These decision points (also 
noted in Figure 3) are Materiel Development Decision, Post-Critical Design Review, and 
Full Rate Production Decision Review. 
 
 
Figure 3. Decision Points in DoD Acquisition Process  (DoDI 5000.02, 2009) 
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 The acquisition process itself is initiated by a validated need identified by the 
military user.  The need can stem from a new threat, capability gap, or even a new 
technological opportunity.  For this need to be addressed via the acquisition process, a 
determination is made whether a Materiel or Non-Materiel Solution is viable.  This 
decision is made at the Materiel Development Decision (MDD) review, which is the 
formal entry point into the acquisition process and is mandatory for all programs.  At this 
decision point, there is not any statutory knowledge requirement.  However, the 
knowledge required by regulation includes an Analysis of Alternatives and an Initial 
Capabilities Document.   
 If a Materiel Solution is deemed the better alternative, the program is authorized 
to enter the Materiel Solution Analysis (MSA) phase.  The purpose of the MSA phase is 
to review potential materiel solutions and satisfy the entrance criteria for the next 
program milestone designated by the MDA.  The Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) Study 
Guidance and the Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) provide direction for the activities 
in this phase.  The AoA focuses on identifying and analyzing alternatives, measures of 
effectiveness, cost, schedule, concepts of operations, and overall risk (Young, Grimes, 
and McQueary, 2008).  The ICD provides the preliminary concept of operations, a 
description of the capability, the operational risk, and the basis for determining that non-
materiel alternatives will not adequately alleviate the capability gap.  The MSA phase 
ends when the AoA has been completed, materiel solution options for the capability need 
identified in the approved ICD have been recommended, and the phase-specific entrance 
criteria for the initial review milestone have been satisfied (Young, Grimes, and 
McQueary, 2008). 
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 The next decision point is the Milestone A review.  This decision authorizes entry 
into the Technology Development phase.  The purpose of this phase is to reduce 
technology risk, determine and mature the proper set of technologies to be included in the 
system, and demonstrate that the technology performs on prototypes.  Table 2 depicts the 
key statutory and regulatory information required of Major Defense Acquisition 
Programs (MDAP) for this phase.  The complete set of information requirements for 
Milestone A can be found in Appendix A. 
 
Table 2.  Key Milestone A Statutory/Regulatory Information 
 
STATUTORY INFORMATION 
REQUIRED 
APPLICABLE STATUTE, POLICY, AND 
OTHER REFERENCES  
Analysis of Alternatives  Subtitle III of title 40, U.S.C., Section 2366a of Title 
10 
Consideration of Technology Issues  Paragraph (b)(5) of Section 2364 of Title 10, U.S.C.  
Independent Cost Estimate  Section 2434 of Title 10, U.S.C.  
Milestone Decision Authority Program 
Certification  
Section 2366a of Title 10, U.S.C.  
Technology Development Strategy (TDS)  Section 803 of Public Law 107-314  
REGULATORY INFORMATION 
REQUIRED 
APPLICABLE REGULATION, POLICY, AND 
OTHER REFERENCES 
Initial Capabilities Document CJCS Instruction 3170.01 
Life-Cycle Support Plan DoD Directive 5250.01 
Systems Engineering Plan DoD Instruction 5000.02 
Test and Evaluation Strategy DoD Instruction 5000.02 
 
 
 The next key decision point is the Milestone B review.  This decision authorizes a 
program to enter the Engineering, Manufacturing, and Development (EMD) phase.  The 
purpose of this phase is to develop a weapon system or an increment of capability.  The 
entrance criteria for this phase depend heavily upon technology maturity, mature/stable 
15 
 
 
requirements, and full funding.  Entrance into EMD also signals the beginning of a 
formal acquisition program.  Table 3 shows both the key statutory and regulatory 
information required for this decision (Young, Grimes, and McQueary, 2008).  The full 
set of requirements can be found in Appendix B. 
 
Table 3.  Key Milestone B Statutory/Regulatory Information 
  
STATUTORY INFORMATION 
REQUIRED 
APPLICABLE STATUTE, POLICY, AND OTHER 
REFERENCES  
Acquisition Program Baseline Section 2435 of title 10, U.S.C. 
Consideration of Technology Issues  Paragraph (b)(5) of Section 2364 of Title 10, U.S.C.  
Independent Cost Estimate  Section 2434 of Title 10, U.S.C.  
Low-Rate Initial Production Quantities Section 2400 of Title 10, U.S.C.  
Live Fire Test and Evaluation Plan Section 2366 of Title 10, U.S.C.  
REGULATORY INFORMATION 
REQUIRED 
APPLICABLE REGULATION, POLICY, AND 
OTHER REFERENCES 
Acquisition Strategy DoD Instruction 5000.02 
Technology Readiness Assessment DoD Instruction 5000.02 
Capabilities Development Document CJCS Instruction 3170.01 
Life-Cycle Support Plan DoD Directive 5250.01 
Systems Engineering Plan DoD Instruction 5000.02 
Test and Evaluation Master Plan DoD Instruction 5000.02 
 
 
 
 The EMD phase contains two major elements:  Integrated System Design (ISD) 
and System Capability and Manufacturing Process Demonstration (SD&MPD).  The ISD 
identifies system and system-of-systems functionality and interfaces, completes design 
for hardware and software, and reduces system-level risk.  The SD&MPD reveals the 
capability of the system to function as designed and be manufactured.  In addition to 
these two efforts, the EMD phase also includes a major decision point:  the Post-Critical 
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Design Review (P-CDR) Assessment.  This assessment offers an opportunity to review 
design maturity (Young, Grimes, and McQueary, 2008). 
 The next and final key decision point addressed in this research is Milestone C.  
This milestone authorizes entrance into the Production and Deployment phase.  The 
intent of this phase is to demonstrate that the production system can operate in 
accordance with the user’s requirements.  Additionally, this phase demonstrates that the 
production system can be manufactured (Young, Grimes, and McQueary, 2008).  Table 4 
shows the key statutory and regulatory information requirements for Milestone C.  The 
full set of requirements can be found in Appendix C. 
 
Table 4.  Key Milestone C Statutory/Regulatory Information Requirements 
 
STATUTORY INFORMATION 
REQUIRED 
APPLICABLE STATUTE, POLICY, AND OTHER 
REFERENCES  
Acquisition Program Baseline Section 2435 of title 10, U.S.C. 
Consideration of Technology Issues  Paragraph (b)(5) of Section 2364 of Title 10, U.S.C.  
Independent Cost Estimate  Section 2434 of Title 10, U.S.C.  
Manpower Estimate Section 2434 of Title 10, U.S.C.  
Analysis of Alternatives Subtitle III of title 40, U.S.C., Section 2366a of title 10 
REGULATORY INFORMATION 
REQUIRED 
APPLICABLE REGULATION, POLICY, AND 
OTHER REFERENCES 
Acquisition Strategy DoD Instruction 5000.02 
Technology Readiness Assessment DoD Instruction 5000.02 
Capabilities Production Document CJCS Instruction 3170.01 
Life-Cycle Support Plan DoD Directive 5250.01 
Systems Engineering Plan DoD Instruction 5000.02 
Test and Evaluation Master Plan DoD Instruction 5000.02 
Independent Technology Readiness 
Assessment (if required) 
DoD Instruction 5000.02 
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Knowledge-Based Decision Support Best Practices 
 
The GAO has completed extensive research with regard to knowledge-based 
decision-making in major system acquisitions.  In fact, the GAO (2008) published their 
findings regarding best practices for developing new products and stated the following: 
 
Good acquisition outcomes require the use of a knowledge-based approach to 
product development that demonstrates high levels of knowledge before 
significant commitments are made.  Achieving the right knowledge at the right 
time enables leadership to make informed decisions about when and how best to 
move into various acquisition phases.  In essence, knowledge supplants risk over 
time.  This building of knowledge consists of information that should be gathered 
at three critical points over the course of a program.  (p.5)  
 
In a 2010 study, the GAO assessed the knowledge attained on 42 major defense 
acquisition programs (MDAP) at key milestones early in the program’s life-cycle (prior 
to Milestone C).  To support the study, the GAO collected data on programs with regard 
to technology maturity, design stability, and production maturity from August 2009 to 
March 2010.  The study centers on the following three key junctures for knowledge 
points.   
- Knowledge Point 1:  Requirements and technological capability are matched 
 
- Knowledge Point 2:  Knowledge that design will work as required 
 
- Knowledge Point 3:  Knowledge that the design can be produced within cost, 
schedule, and quality targets 
 
Figure 4 shows these knowledge points in relation to key phases in the product 
development cycle.  
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Figure 4.  Best Practices in Product Development (GAO, 2008) 
 
 
 
 The first of these knowledge points suggests that a match should occur between 
what is needed and what is available in terms of technology, design, and funding.  This 
knowledge point occurs after the completion of the technology development phase.  A 
good gauge of whether a match is made is noting the level of technology maturity at the 
beginning of the development stage.  A match occurs when a program has demonstrated 
that the critical technologies have been verified to work in their intended environment 
(GAO, 2008).  The GAO (2010) found that programs in general are not conducting 
systems engineering reviews early in the program to ensure a match between resources 
and requirements.   
The second knowledge point represents the fact that a product’s design should be 
demonstrated to function as planned and meet the requirements that have been 
established (GAO, 2008).  For DoD milestone decision authorities, this means being 
assured that the system design is stable and will perform in a way that was expected by 
the user.  According to the GAO, program stability should be reached by the halfway 
point of system development.  An indicator of design stability is the completion of at 
least 90 percent of engineering drawings by the Critical Design Review (GAO, 2008).  
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Additionally, the engineering drawings and designs should accurately reflect the results 
obtained from testing the system in question.   
This leads to the third knowledge point, which suggests that a product should only 
be considered reliable when it can be created within the stated costs, schedule, and 
quality levels.  An important indication of whether a product or system is reliable is when 
it can be created over and over with the same level of performance and reliability (Garrett 
and Rendon, 2005).  To facilitate reliability, a best practice is to make certain that all 
critical manufacturing processes are in statistical control at the start of production (GAO, 
2008).  A program should ensure that all critical manufacturing knowledge is attained 
before entering production.  If achieved, then the program will have a stable 
manufacturing process that will work as intended and meet cost, schedule, and quality 
objectives.  Figure 5 is an example of how the best practices can be used to assess an 
acquisition program.  The desired level (dotted line) is the indicator of where the program 
should be in terms of best practice.  The hypothesis is the closer the program is to the 
desired level; the more likely the program will be within cost and schedule (GAO, 2010).   
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Figure 5.  Product Knowledge as Compared with Best Practices (GAO, 2008) 
 
Application of GAO Knowledge Points:  National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
To apply the knowledge points, the GAO (2005) reviewed and analyzed the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) project management policies 
and compared them to the GAO’s best practices on knowledge-based decision making.  
The study was primarily focused on the Goddard Space Flight Center, the Jet Propulsion 
Lab, Johnson Space Center, and Marshall Space Flight Center.  During its investigation, 
the GAO found NASA deficient in key criteria and decision reviews to fully implement a 
knowledge-based acquisition framework.   
There were, however, some best practices followed.  For example, NASA 
required projects to hold a major decision review before progressing from formulation to 
implementation.  Additionally, projects were required to validate requirements, develop 
cost and schedule estimates, create preliminary design, and have an approved technology 
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plan.  All of these requirements were in sync with the GAO’s Knowledge Point 1: 
Matching requirements with technology capability.  The issue is that NASA does not 
require the technology used in its projects to be at a high level of maturity at that point.  
The GAO insists that this increases the risk that requirements will not be met.   
  Another area found to be deficient was the NASA policy of not specifying the 
type of reviews that project managers should hold at key points in the product 
development cycle.  The GAO indicated that technical reviews allow decision-makers to 
acquire key knowledge at critical junctures in the project’s development.  As a result, the 
GAO concluded that NASA was increasing the risk of cost and schedule overruns.   
  The last issue GAO found during its study of NASA was the non-standard use of 
criteria for indicators of program success at key decision points.  This resulted in each 
center within NASA reporting on different types of project knowledge at key decision 
points.  At the time of the report, NASA had experienced a loss of experienced project 
managers and system engineers.  This loss of key personnel combined with lack of 
standardized criteria exacerbated the problem (GAO, 2005).  
   The GAO (2005) made several recommendations to improve NASA management 
policies.  Two recommendations centered on NASA using a knowledge-based acquisition 
approach to improve its decision-making.  As such, it recommended that NASA take the 
following actions: 
1. Require the capture of specific knowledge to be used as criteria for allowing 
projects to enter implementation and proceed through development and to support 
informed investment decisions. 
 
2. Institute additional reviews for projects during project implementation, which 
result in recommendations to the appropriate decision authority.  
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In response to the GAO findings, NASA issued a revised acquisition policy in 
2007.  The new policy instituted Key Decision Points (KDP) in the development life-
cycle for NASA’s space flight programs and ground station projects.  Additionally, the 
policy established a decision authority at each KDP responsible for authorizing the 
entrance into the next phase.  The policy also required new technologies to be sufficiently 
mature at the preliminary design review (GAO, 2009). 
 In a follow-up study, the GAO (2009) again reviewed NASA’s projects.  In this 
review, the GAO assessed cost and schedule data for 13 programs.  They found that 10 of 
the 13 programs experienced an average cost growth of 13 percent (based on 2008 data) 
since the GAO review in 2005.  The average schedule delay for the 13 programs was 11 
months.  GAO concluded that in spite of the new policy, the lack of knowledge at key 
junctures and the continued use of immature technologies continued to contribute to cost 
growth and schedule delay. 
Application of Statistical Decision Model:  University of Southern California 
 The study of the use of knowledge-based decision methodologies in DoD 
acquisitions, such as the use of statistical tests and models, is an area that has been largely 
unexplored.  A study by Cohen, Rolph, and Steffey (1988) examined the statistical 
techniques in the design and evaluation of operational test and evaluation.  One of the 
conclusions from that study notes the following: 
For many defense systems, the current operational testing paradigm restricts the 
application of statistical techniques and thereby reduces their potential benefits by 
preventing the integration of all available and relevant information for use in 
planning and carrying out tests and in making production decisions.  This 
paradigm is was noted as the major players in the acquisition process – the 
program manager, test organization, the contractor, user, and Congress – have 
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very different (and sometimes competing) perspectives on how knowledge is 
applied.  As a result, even in those situations where knowledge is available that 
could be used to make good programmatic decisions; those that are involved in 
the decision-making process may be pressured to do otherwise.  (p.47)       
 
Boehm, Port, Huang, and Brown (2002) created a spatial model that can be used to 
generate several acquisition models related to user satisfaction, cost, and quality 
constraints.  The models take into account the expectations of key stakeholders, system 
requirements, system features, and development procedures.  The models require a great 
deal of knowledge from all stakeholders involved in the development process.  In their 
study, this model was used on 26 University of Southern California projects.  The results 
showed that 24 out of 26 projects were successful in terms of meeting cost, schedule, and 
performance objectives.  The importance of these results is that they show that 
knowledge-based decision support models could possibly be used effectively for DoD 
acquisitions.   
Application of RAND’s Decision Framework:  National Security Agency 
 In 2006, the RAND Corporation partnered with the Intelligence Support Systems 
(ISS) division at the National Security Administration to pilot RAND’s Portfolio 
Management (PortMan) Decision Framework.  The framework can be used for Research 
and Development (R&D) projects or Operations and Maintenance (O&M) projects.  The 
purpose of the model is to assess the Expected Value of a group of actual or proposed 
projects.   
The Expected Value can then be used as knowledge upon which to make 
decisions that maximize the value of R&D funding for a portfolio.  RAND’s PortMan 
model computes the Expected Value of a R&D project from two primary knowledge 
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factors:  value of successful implementation and the probability of successful 
implementation.  The value of successful implementation is based on the value of the 
capability to the organization and the extent to which the performance potential matches 
the resources required to achieve the capability.  The probability of successful 
implementation is a measure of the risk associated with implementing an R&D project or 
sustaining an O&M project (RAND, 2004).  The Expected Value (EV) of a project is 
defined as the Value of Successful Implementation multiplied by the Probability of 
Successful Implementation. 
For this particular study, RAND (2006) developed two different sets of metrics 
for estimating the Expected Value.  They created one set for R&D projects and another 
set for Operations and Maintenance (O&M) projects.  A total of 17 projects were 
evaluated in the pilot study.  To estimate the three factors for the Expected Value, RAND 
performed a Delphi exercise using the members of the ISS’s Senior Leadership Group 
(SLG).  The SLG were senior decision-makers in the ISS organization.  Each SLG 
member was given a series of questions and a ranking scale to provide answers.  After 
several rounds to reach consensus, the answers were converted to a numeric score and 
averaged to provide values for the Expected Value (RAND, 2006). 
The results of the RAND study concluded that the ranking of projects using the 
decision model was significantly different than the ranking from the ISS methodology, 
which was based on undocumented metrics.  RAND (2006) concluded the following: the 
RAND PortMan model can be effectively applied to both R&D and O&M portfolio 
decisions and the model can be used for both near-term (single fiscal year) decisions and 
as well as long-term decisions.   
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Chapter III.  Methodology 
 
      
This investigation used a qualitative research methodology to answer the research 
questions offered in the first chapter.  The rationale for using qualitative methods was 
based on the fact that three different information types were gathered:  (1) secondary data 
consisting of survey responses to open-ended questions, (2) knowledge required by either 
federal statute or Department of Defense (DoD) regulation at key decision points, and (3) 
knowledge-based decision-making best practices.  The second and third information 
types were obtained through the literature review.   
This chapter includes four main sections.  The first section provides an overview 
of the thesis research methodology.  The second discusses the survey effort, while the 
third section describes how data reduction was performed to analyze content.  Finally, the 
fourth section summarizes the method used to compare information types and identify 
themes represented within the data by describing the assessment model. 
 
Overall Research Methodology 
 
The overall research approach followed the nine-step framework proposed by 
Buchanan (1980) as shown in Figure 6.  Additionally, Booth, Colomb, and Williams 
(2003) suggest that an extensive research topic is selected and then confined to develop a 
manageable thesis statement.  In that regard, this research focused on “knowledge-based 
decision-making,” which was then was confined to “knowledge-based decision-making 
in DoD acquisition.”  As stated in Chapter I, the following investigative questions were 
subsequently established. 
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1. What are the critical pieces of information that are required for an informed 
decision at key decision points in the acquisition process? 
2. How does the currently available information (contained in required decision 
products) compare to what is needed for decisions with regard to technology, 
design, and production knowledge for each of the key decision points in the 
acquisition process? 
3. What is the effect of this resulting lack of information on DoD acquisition 
programs?   
 
4. Can this effect be quantified in terms of cost, schedule, and performance? 
 
 
 
Figure 6.  Research Methodology (Buchanan, 1980) 
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This chapter thus focuses on steps five and six of Buchanan’s (1980) framework:  
data collection and data analysis.  Step five (data collection) involved both secondary 
data and extraction of data from existing documents.  Step six (data analysis) consisted of 
three parallel activities adopted from the analysis framework developed by Miles and 
Huberman (1994).  The framework describes the major phases of data analysis as data 
reduction, data display, and conclusion drawing and verification.  Figure 7 illustrates the 
data analysis framework.     
 
 
 
Figure 7.  Data Analysis Framework (Miles and Huberman, 1994) 
 
 
Survey Effort 
 
For this research effort, the survey data was obtained from SAF/ACPO (Air Force 
Acquisition Chief Process Office).  SAF/ACPO, in conjunction with the Center for 
Reengineering and Enabling Technology (CRET), was charged with reviewing and 
validating the GAO findings primarily with regard to knowledge-based decision support 
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and improving the fidelity of acquisition decision-making within the U.S. Air Force.  
SAF/ACPO chose senior-level personnel from across the Air Force acquisition 
community.  All personal identifiable information was removed from the data before it 
was used for this research.   
Survey Construction 
The questions asked during the survey are provided in Table 5.  The questionnaire 
provided to the participants was relatively short.  The people solicited for this study are 
senior acquisition officials with many responsibilities.  Providing them with a long and 
cumbersome interview that required a great deal of time would have likely resulted in 
few, or possibly no, responses.  Furthermore, with a few very direct and relevant 
questions, it can be possible to get directly to the core of the issues being researched and 
not have to deal with a great deal of information and data that may have little or no 
relevancy to the research problem being addressed. 
The questions shown in Table 5 were chosen for inclusion in the survey because 
they allowed the participants to provide information about the type of knowledge that is 
used in the decision-making process, how other stakeholders are involved in the process, 
and whether additional knowledge sets would be considered valuable in the acquisition 
process.  These questions provided a means for not only gaining insight into the 
knowledge set in decision-making process, but also how that knowledge set is used to 
make decisions.   
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Table 5.  Survey Questions 
 
 
1. Does your organization have any ongoing initiatives that address GAO findings? 
If so, what is the initiative and what is its purpose?  
 
2. What major decision product(s) does your organization create?  (A decision product 
is defined as any object (report, review, plan, document package, database update, etc.) 
that is used to make an Acquisition Decision.  These items include Budget Execution 
Documentation, Justification Documents, Monthly Acquisition Reports, etc.  Items that 
we are not looking to identify are Weekly Reports, Org Status Reports, etc.) 
3. Who are the customer(s) of these decision product(s)? 
4. What decision product(s) do you receive? 
 
5. What are the source(s) or supplier(s) of these products?  
 
6. What feedback does your organization receive from your customer(s)?  
 
7. What feedback does/would your organization give to your suppliers(s)?  
8. What acquisition decision(s) does your customer(s) make relative to the decision 
product(s) your organization provides to them?  (An Acquisition Decision is an event 
that yields an outcome that has an impact on another organization or ACAT designated 
program within the Acquisition Lifecycle). 
9. What acquisition decision(s) does your organization make relative to the decision 
product(s)? 
10. What is the intent of the decision product?  Does the decision product meet its 
intended purpose? 
11. What information products do you believe that your organization should receive 
(missing information) that would improve your acquisition decision making 
process? 
12. What information products does your organization receive that are non-value 
added in the acquisition decision making process? 
 
13. What Regulations and Policies require that your organization creates these 
products?  
14. Do you use an IT System to create/retrieve a decision product?  If so, what is its 
name?  
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Survey Administration 
The survey instrument was sent to the participants with an explanation of the 
research being conducted and how their assistance would help with the project.  The 
participants were asked to respond to the questions and send the information back to 
SAF/ACPO.  In all instances, the questions were either answered in electronic format and 
returned to SAF/ACPO via email or answered via teleconference.  
Population of Interest  
The sample population for this study consisted of 12 acquisition decision-makers 
in the U.S. Air Force.  While this may seem like a relatively low sample, it is much larger 
than was expected and provides a great deal of information that can be analyzed from 
within a single acquisition organization.  The population size of the ACAT I and II 
acquisition milestone decision-makers within the Air Force is relatively small.  Figure 8 
offers a view of the number of Acquisition Category (ACAT) IC and II programs with 
regard to the milestone decision authorities as of FY09.  ACAT I programs  are estimated 
by the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) 
(USD(AT&L)) to require eventual expenditure for Research, Development, Test and 
Evaluation (RDT&E) funding of more than $365 million (Fiscal Year (FY) 2000 constant 
dollars) or procurement of more than $2.19 billion (FY 2000 constant dollars).  ACAT II 
programs are estimated by the DoD Component Head to require eventual expenditure for 
RDT&E of more than $140 million in FY 2000 constant dollars, or for procurement of 
more than $660 million in FY 2000 constant dollars. 
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                       Figure 8.  USAF Acquisition Programs by MDA Type (FY09) 
 
The number of Air Force ACAT IC and II programs is 17 and 25, respectively.  Of these 
42 programs, the 12 participants were the milestone decision authority for 23 programs.  
What is also important is that the information obtained from these participants was 
complete in terms of answering all of the questions in the questionnaire.  In addition, the 
participants often included their own comments or opinions.  It should be noted that the 
actual people completing the surveys were individuals that are the decision-makers 
within their respective acquisition organization and not support personnel.  All of the 
respondents were civilians or military members of the rank O-6/GS-15 or above.   
 
Data Reduction and Content Analysis 
 
Within the Miles and Huberman (1994) framework, the researcher used Microsoft 
Excel as a means for data reduction to analyze content for all three sets of data.  The first 
set of data analyzed was the program knowledge products required by either federal 
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statute or DoD regulation at Key Decision Points.  The initial step was to create a matrix 
that captured all knowledge products and indicated whether each one was required by 
statute or regulation; the matrix also indicated to which Key Decision Point the 
knowledge product is applicable.  Table 6 shows a sample of the matrix.   
 
Table 6.  Program Knowledge Product Matrix 
 
 
 
 
The next data reduction technique was to align the knowledge products to one (or 
more) of five key program parameters:  Requirements, Cost, Schedule, Technical 
Performance, and Funding.  This enabled the researcher to group the knowledge support 
products according to the area in which they provide decision support.  It also facilitated 
the elimination of knowledge products that did not support one of the aforementioned 
program parameters.  Table 7 shows a sample of the Knowledge Products and their 
alignment with five key program parameters.  
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Table 7.  Knowledge Products Alignment with Knowledge Areas 
 
 
 
 
The next data reduction technique was performed on both the Knowledge 
Products and the GAO’s knowledge-based decision-making best practices.  This 
technique helped the researcher align the knowledge products with best practices 
according to the GAO:  technology maturity, design stability, and production maturity.  
Since the Knowledge Points are limited to requirements, design, and technical aspects of 
programs, this alignment helped the researcher further reduce the number of knowledge 
products to use in the research.  Table 8 shows how Knowledge Products are aligned with 
Knowledge Points. 
 
 
Table 8.  Alignment of Knowledge Products and Knowledge Points 
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The final data reduction techniques were performed on the answers from the 
questionnaire.  The respondents were asked 14 total questions, but only three questions 
were applicable to this research.  However, the respondents’ answers to the remaining 11 
questions were taken into consideration for recommendations made at the conclusion of 
this research.  The following three questions were used for this research: 
1. What is the intent of the decision product?  Does the decision product meet its 
intended purpose?  
 
2. What information products do you believe that your organization should 
receive (missing information) that would improve your acquisition decision-
making process? 
 
3. What information products does your organization receive that are non-value 
added in the acquisition decision-making process 
The answers to these questions were analyzed and all comments that referred to any 
decision support product were extracted and aligned with the appropriate decision 
product. 
For the first question, the assumption made for this research was if the knowledge 
product cannot meet its intended purpose, then it also cannot effectively support 
decisions based on its intended purpose.  Question 1a (What is the intent of the decision 
product?) was not used unless the comments supported answers given in other questions.  
Question 1b solicited a binary response (“YES” or “NO” unless the respondent left this 
answer blank) and the responses were recorded in the matrix.  Table 9, on the following 
page, shows a sample of the respondents’ answers to Question 1b. 
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Table 9.  Knowledge Products Aligned with Survey Results (Question 1b) 
 
 
 
 
 Questions 2 and 3 offered the respondents the opportunity to share which 
knowledge products they thought are missing and those which are non-value added, 
respectively.  Question 2 captured the knowledge products that could improve their 
decision-making abilities.  There were very few responses in this area.  The researcher 
compared this list of knowledge products with those mandated by law or regulation.  If it 
was listed and required by law or regulation, then the answer was ignored.  Question 3 
solicited the non-value added knowledge products in the acquisition process.  If any 
knowledge product was listed as non-value added by the majority of the respondents 
(seven or more) and not required by law or regulation, then that knowledge product was 
not included in this research. 
  
Comparison of Information Types 
 
 Miles and Huberman (1994) describe data reduction activity as the process of 
choosing, simplifying, and changing the data that is obtained in the research process.  To 
analyze the data and help answer the research questions, a scoring assessment matrix was 
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created.  This assessment focused on the relationship of the information required by 
statute and regulation to key program parameters:  requirements, cost, schedule, 
performance, and program funding.  It also took into consideration the responses from the 
questionnaire that addressed the importance of the decision support information.   
Assessment Model 
The assessment was accomplished at six key decision points in the acquisition 
process:  Materiel Development Decision, Milestone A, Milestone B, Post Critical 
Design Review – A, Milestone C, and the Full Rate Production Decision Review.  This 
assessment used a scoring schema to rate the decision support for each decision.  In 
addition to reducing the data, this research altered some responses without changing the 
intent of the individual surveyed.  This was accomplished to make data more 
manageable.    
 The assessment model is based on four criteria statements.  Each statement has 
three possible criteria responses.  To assess each area based on the responses, a score was 
assigned to each response.  If the response was ‘YES’, then a ‘+1’ was scored for that 
particular statement.  If the response was ‘NO’, then a ‘-1’ was scored for that particular 
statement.  If the response was ‘Not Applicable’, then a ‘0’ was scored for that statement.  
Table 10 shows the statements, responses, and corresponding scores.  Table 11 shows an 
example of the scoring schema for one Decision Support Product (DSP). 
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Table 10.  Knowledge Assessment Criteria Statements and Responses 
 
 
 
Table 11.  Knowledge Area Assessment Scoring Example 
 
 
 
 
Decision support products selected for the knowledge assessments were based on 
the products most frequently used by the decision-makers responding to the 
questionnaire.  Each decision support product was rated in accordance with the score for 
each knowledge area.  Each decision support product can score a maximum of 4 points 
and a minimum of -4 points, where positive numbers indicate better decision support.  
Table 12 shows the scoring schema for decision support products. 
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Table 12.  Scoring Schema for Assessment Model 
 
 Score Assessment 
GREEN  2.50   –  4.00 Decision Support Product is available and provides 
adequate information to make informed decision  
YELLOW  0.01   –  2.49 Decision Support Products are either not applicable or 
more information is needed to make informed 
decision  
RED  - 4.00   –   0.00 Additional decision support is needed  
 
 
 
 The last step in using the model is to assess each knowledge area based on the 
individual decision support products.  This research used a quantitative method to assign 
scores.  The score for each knowledge area was computed by averaging the individual 
scores of the decision support products.  Table 13 provides an example of a knowledge 
area assessment.     
 
 
Table 13.  Example of Knowledge Area Assessment 
 
 
 
 
The next activity of the data analysis framework is verification and validity.  
Miles and Huberman (1994) stated that in this phase, the data should be tested for 
creditability and validility.  In this phase, as Miles and Huberman (1994) suggest, before 
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drawing conclusions from the data, the research must again consider what the analyzed 
data mean and then assess the implications toward the research question.  In reviewing 
the data, the researcher consistently asked the following question:  does this research 
method make sense?  In this case, the researcher purposely kept the methods simple and 
easy to understand.  Also, any assumptions were clearly and distinctly indicated in the 
research.    
The final step is addressing what Miles and Huberman (1994) calls the pragmatic 
validity.  Although formed in the academic setting, qualitative research should be one 
that can be extended to other environments.  The researcher sought to focus on ensuring 
that the research conducted can be utilized outside of the academic environment.   
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Chapter IV.  Data Analysis 
 
 
 The intent of this chapter is to present the analysis of the data gathered during this 
research.  As previously discussed, the data was derived from three separate sources.  All 
three were used to create an assessment model for knowledge areas supporting the six 
major decision points in the Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition process.  Decision 
support products in the following six knowledge areas were assessed:  program 
requirements, cost, schedule, performance, funding, and strategy.  The knowledge 
support assessment results were based on the statutory/regulatory requirement, answers 
provided by acquisition decision makers with regard to how well the products met their 
intended purpose and if the product was needed to make decisions, and the alignment of 
the knowledge products with best practices.  The subsequent sections present the analysis 
in greater detail.    
 
Knowledge Area: Program Requirements 
 
The first knowledge area assessed in this research was program requirements.  
The Initial Capabilities Document (ICD), Capability Development Document (CDD), and 
Capability Production Document (CPD) are the primary capability documents that 
provide decision support in this knowledge area.  These documents capture the 
requirements for which an acquisition program is based.  Decisions made in the 
acquisition process should support filling the capability gap being addressed in the 
capability document.  Figure 9 shows the interrelationship of the requirements process 
and the acquisition process. 
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Figure 9.  Interrelationship of the Requirements Process and the Acquisition Process  
                 (Defense Acquisition Guidebook, 2009) 
 
Capability Documents 
Since the knowledge contained within capability documents serve as the basis for 
acquisition efforts, it was an area that was expected to score well in the assessment.  
Capability documents are required by regulation at every major decision point in the 
acquisition process.  Nine respondents indicated that requirements documents met their 
intended purpose.  However, two stated that it is not always clear if the capability 
documents (in particular the Initial Capability Document) are compliant with the DoD 
Architectural Framework (DoDAF).  The DoDAF is a reference model to organize the 
enterprise architecture (EA) and systems architecture into complementary and consistent 
views.  In addition, although compliancy is required, the benefit of being compliant is not 
well understood in the acquisition community.  In their comments, the respondents stated 
that the acquisition community is typically not an active participant in the requirements 
generation process because it is not transparent to them how the systems being acquired 
fit into the overall DoD framework.        
Capability documents scored an average of 4 (out of a max score of 4) for this 
knowledge area.  This score reflects the importance, availability, and use of requirements 
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in making decisions in the acquisition process.  Requirements documents ranked as the 
number one decision support product for knowledge support in this research.  This 
indicates that the products are available and provide useful information that is used to 
make decisions in the program requirements knowledge area.  Table 14 shows the results 
of the scoring in by each decision point. 
 
                   Table 14.  Capability Documents Knowledge Assessment 
 
 
 
Scope Evolution 
Scope evolution is the next decision support document supporting the program 
requirement knowledge area.  Scope evolution documents capture changes in program 
requirements prior to Milestone B (particularly before a program is formally baselined 
with an Acquisition Program Baseline (APB)).  This knowledge support was referred to 
by nine respondents.  All nine indicated that stability of capability requirements 
(performance or quantity) is critical to program success as changes in requirements 
impact program cost and schedule.  There is no statutory or regulatory document required 
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for a scope evolution document.  However, all changes to Key Performance Parameters 
in the APB (established after Milestone B) are tracked by all MDAP programs.     
Three respondents indicated an issue with changes in requirements prior to 
Milestone B.  The issue is that changes to requirements after a program has started are 
costly.  Additionally, one respondent stated that the “appetite for the latest and greatest 
technology is eating our lunch, when a lesser, more mature technology is sufficient.”  
This is consistent with the results of a RAND Corporation study conducted in 2006.  For 
every type of ship they studied, the price escalation rates ranged from 7 to 11 percent 
annually between 1950 and 2000.  For every type of aircraft that was examined, the price 
escalation rates ranged from 7 to 12 percent annually between 1974 and 2005.  Since the 
average annual inflation rate between 1965 and 2004 was 4.7%, RAND (2006) concluded 
that the price growth above the inflation index stemmed from the desire for more 
capabilities.     
Four respondents suggested that more programs follow an incremental acquisition 
strategy that locks program requirements at Milestone A.  They went on to state that any 
change (increase) in requirements should be acquired through separate increments.  This 
approach is limited, however, to the manner in which the capabilities are required by the 
user.  For example, capability documents may not separate requirements into increments, 
thus forcing the acquisition community to acquire most if not all capabilities for a 
program at once.   
Scope evolution documents scored an -1.  This low score is not indicative of the 
value of the knowledge product, but rather an indication that the knowledge is not 
required by statute or regulation.  This score indicates that more knowledge is needed to 
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support decisions in this knowledge area.  These decision support documents are aligned 
with both Knowledge Point 1: Requirements and Technology Capability are Matched and 
Knowledge Point 2: Design will work as required.  Table 15, on the following page, 
shows the scoring of this assessment area. 
 
Table 15.  Scope Evolution Knowledge Assessment 
 
 
 
Knowledge Area: Program Cost 
 
 This knowledge area focuses on program cost for DoD major acquisition 
programs.  There are many documents used by the individual services that support this 
knowledge, including the initial proposals submitted by industry partners.  In addition, 
each service produces a cost estimate usually referred to as the Service Cost Position.  
However, this research focused on the two documents that are mandated by statute or 
regulation:  the Independent Cost Estimate and the Affordability Assessment.   
Independent Cost Estimate 
 The Independent Cost Estimate (ICE) estimates the full life-cycle cost for a 
MDAP; required by statute, it is prepared by the Director of Cost Assessment and 
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Program Evaluation (DCAPE).  The ICE is required at Milestones A, B, and C.  The ICE 
was commented on by 11 respondents.  All indicated that the document supported 
decisions, but nine acknowledged that cost estimating is an issue for MDAPs.  The issue 
as directly stated by seven respondents is that costs are routinely underestimated.   
These statements are supported by a 2008 RAND study pertaining to the sources 
of cost growth in MDAPs.  In the study (RAND, 2008), 68 programs were examined over 
the previous 30 years.  They found that after adjusting for changes in the quantity of 
systems produced, costs grew by 46 percent on average over the estimate at development 
approval (Milestone B).  Since the respondents stated that this decision support document 
was historically underestimated, the product was assessed as not meeting its intent.  
Overall, the ICE was assessed with a score of 2.  Table 16 shows the scoring of this 
decision support product. 
 
Table 16.  Independent Cost Estimate Knowledge Assessment 
 
 
 
Affordability Assessment 
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The next document, which is required at Milestones B and C, assessed in the 
program cost knowledge area is the Affordability Assessment.  The intent of this 
document is to demonstrate that the program’s projected funding and manpower are 
practical and attainable.  This knowledge support area was addressed by ten respondents, 
all indicating that it met its purpose.  Seven respondents’ comments were focused on the 
staffing level of program offices prior to Milestone B, which is when major acquisition 
efforts are designated as programs.  The comments suggested that Pre-Milestone B 
programs are ill-equipped to be successful at this stage because the staffing level is too 
low in comparison to the workload.  For this reason, it was recommended that this 
document be mandated for Milestone A.  Table 17 shows the scoring of this decision 
support product.  
 
Table 17.  Affordability Assessment Knowledge Assessment 
 
 
 
Knowledge Area: Program Schedule 
 
 This research assessed two key documents supporting the schedule knowledge 
area.  The first document is the Integrated Master Schedule (IMS).  The IMS is an 
integrated, networked schedule containing all the details necessary to accomplish the 
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work specified in the Integrated Master Plan (IMP), which is the second document 
assessed.  Since both documents are closely related, both were be assessed together.  
While the IMS is not required by statute or regulation as a standalone document in the 
acquisition process, both the acquisition strategy and the APB address schedule 
parameters for MDAPs.   
Integrated Master Schedule 
All 12 respondents commented on program schedule.  Eleven specifically stated 
that it is a value-added document for the decision-making process.  However, four 
respondents made comments indicating that the government is too dependent on the 
defense partners for “detailed schedule information.”  Two of these comments were 
based on experiences in which schedule risks were not reported by the contractor until 
they became issues for the government.  Additionally, five respondents indicated that 
IMS information is, at times, too complex to be used to make decisions.   
Integrated Master Plan 
The IMP is the next document that supports the schedule knowledge area.  Like 
the IMS, it is not required by statute or regulation.  The IMS is an event-based plan 
detailed in a hierarchy of work events.  None of the respondents made comments 
specifically with regard to the IMP.  However, nine made mention of a program’s critical 
path, which was determined to be a key information source for making decisions.  Since 
the IMP contains all program tasks, this research inferred that the respondents deemed the 
IMP as meeting its purpose.  Both the IMS and IMP are aligned with Knowledge Point 3: 
Design can be produced within, cost, schedule, and quality targets.  Table 18 shows the 
scoring for these decision support products. 
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Table 18.  Integrated Master Schedule/Plan Knowledge Assessment 
 
 
 
 
Knowledge Area: Technical Performance 
 Six decision support products were assessed for program performance:  Systems 
Engineering Plan (SEP), Consideration for Technology Issues, Test and Evaluation 
Strategy (TES), Independent Technology Readiness Assessment (ITRA), Technical 
Readiness Assessment (TRA), and the Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP).  All six 
of these documents are required by either statute or regulation.  For purposes of this 
research, the ITRA and the TRA will be considered the same document and scored 
similarly.  Similarly, Test and Evaluation Strategy (TES) and the Test and Evaluation 
Master Plan (TEMP) were considered together.   
Systems Engineering Plan 
 The System Engineering Plan (SEP) is the next knowledge support document 
assessed for this research.  The SEP’s purpose is to guide programs in their systems 
engineering approach, while providing a documented technical foundation for the 
program.  It documents key technical risks, processes, resources, and metrics associated 
with the program.  The SEP was commented on by all 12 respondents.  All indicated that 
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it was a document that met its intent in supporting decisions.  However, only three 
respondents felt that the SEP provided information that was needed to make decisions.   
Eight respondents felt that the most important attribute of the SEP is the success 
criteria for the technical reviews.  These comments aligned well with the best practices 
found by the GAO (Knowledge Point 2: Design can be work as required), which uses the 
percentage of engineering drawings completed or projected for completion by the Critical 
Design Review as one critical success factor.  Four respondents made comments 
regarding the standardization of the SEP.  They stated that the lack of a mandated format 
made it difficult to use for making program decisions.  Table 19 shows the scoring for 
this knowledge support document.  
 
 
Table 19.  Systems Engineering Plan Knowledge Assessment 
 
 
 
Consideration for Technology Issues  
Consideration for Technology Issues is the second decision support document 
assessed for this area.  It is required by statute at Milestones A and B.  The law mandates 
that programs provide documentation regarding the use of relevant technologies.  
Therefore, programs must address whether or not relevant technologies exist.  They also 
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must prove the rationale for choosing to not use technologies if they exist.  Lastly, the 
program must document existing relevant technologies that will be incorporated into the 
program.   
Ten respondents commented on this knowledge support product.  Eight stated that 
this document did not add value to the decision-making process.  Of those eight, six 
stated that the intent of the document is captured in other required documentation.  Two 
respondents stated that they did not understand the purpose of the document.  As a result, 
this document was considered to be one that did not meet its intent.  Furthermore, this 
knowledge support document is not aligned with any of the Knowledge Points.  Table 20 
shows the scoring for this area.   
 
Table 20.  Consideration for Technology Issues Knowledge Assessment 
 
 
 
Technology Readiness Assessment  
The next decision support documents supporting the technical performance area 
were the Independent Technology Readiness Assessment (ITRA) and Technology 
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Readiness Assessment (TRA).  Both documents have the same intent.  The difference is 
that the Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) of 2009 allows the 
Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) to, in addition to the TRA, 
require an additional independent assessment of the technology readiness.  
The law also required DDR&E to develop a knowledge-based standard against 
which Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) can be assessed.  The law mandated the 
integration of risk of critical technologies at key stages in the acquisition process.  The 
TRA is required at Milestone B and at Milestone C.  Nine respondents commented on the 
TRA, with all comments indicating that the decision support document met its intended 
purpose and that the information provided by the document was needed to make 
decisions.  Table 21 shows the scoring for these documents. 
 
 
Table 21.  Technology Readiness Assessment Knowledge Assessment 
 
 
 
Test and Evaluation Strategy/Test and Evaluation Master Plan 
 The last two documents supporting this knowledge area are the Test and 
Evaluation Strategy (TES) and the Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP).  The intent 
of both documents is very similar.  The TES describes the approach for test and 
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evaluation for programs prior to Milestone B.  The TEMP, which evolves from the TES, 
documents the overall structure and objectives for the test and evaluation program 
beyond Milestone B.  Both documents are required by regulation.  All 12 respondents 
made comments indicating that these documents met their respective purpose.  However, 
only five indicated that they were needed to make decisions.  Four of the five stated that 
test and evaluation results, rather than the plan itself, was useful in making decisions.  
These documents are aligned with Knowledge Point 2: Design will work as required.  
Table 22 shows the assessment for these documents. 
 
Table 22.  Test and Evaluation Knowledge Assessment 
 
 
 
Knowledge Area: Funding 
 
 The next knowledge area deals with program funding.  Like the cost knowledge 
area, there are several different products supporting this knowledge area.  Most of the 
funding products produce similar information; therefore, this research focused on only 
two decision support documents:  the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) certification 
at Milestone A and the Non-Advocate Cost Assessment, which is a document primarily 
used by the Air Force acquisition community.  
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Milestone Decision Authority Certification 
The MDA certification memorandum is required by the Weapons Systems 
Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) of 2009 for all MDAPs at Milestone A.  The 
WSARA required the MDA to sign a memorandum for record that certifies the following 
program attributes:  
1. Program fulfills an approved ICD, executed by competent entity. 
2. Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) has been performed, and cost estimate is 
complete.   
3. If the program exceeds 25% of the cost or schedule target prior to Milestone B, 
then program termination must be considered.   
 
At the time of the survey, the WSARA of 2009 was not signed into law.  
However, all 12 respondents had knowledge of the upcoming law and provided 
comments.  For this reason, the answers provided may have been skewed since their 
answers may not have been based on factual information regarding MDA certification.  
All 12 respondents felt this ‘Nunn-McCurdy’ like process was being conducted too early 
in the program life.  One respondent stated that in the early stages of the acquisition 
process, scope is still being defined based on funding, cost, technology maturity, and 
initial requirements; therefore, the program should not be baselined.  Another respondent 
said this will lead programs to artificially inflate their cost and schedule estimates in 
order to avoid breaching the threshold.  None of the respondents indicated that this 
document added any value to the decision-making process.  This document is aligned 
with Knowledge Point 3: Design can be produced within cost, schedule, and quality 
targets.  Table 23 shows the scoring for this decision support document.   
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Table 23.  Milestone Decision Authority Certification Knowledge Assessment 
 
 
 
 
Non-Advocate Cost Assessment 
 The Non-Advocate Cost Assessment (NACA) is an analysis of a program’s cost, 
price, and technical risk.  The primary assessment compares the cost of a program with 
the program’s FYDP budget and assesses whether the program can be successful within 
its cost targets.  It is prepared by an independent organization.  Ten respondents stated 
that they use NACAs when making decisions, which indicates that the document meets 
its intended purpose.  The NACA is aligned with Knowledge Point 3: Design can be 
produced within cost, schedule, and quality targets.  Table 24 shows the scoring for this 
decision support product.  
 
Table 24.  Non-Advocate Cost Assessment Knowledge Assessment 
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Knowledge Areas:  Program Strategy  
The decision support documents supporting this knowledge area are those that 
provide the overall strategy that will achieve the cost, schedule, and technical 
performance objectives of the program.  These documents are the Technology 
Development Strategy (TDS), Acquisition Strategy, Acquisition Program Baseline 
(APB), and the Life-Cycle Support Plan (LCSP).  All four documents are required by 
either statute or regulation.  
Acquisition Strategy 
 The first decision support product in this knowledge area is the Acquisition 
Strategy.  The Acquisition Strategy is the all-inclusive plan that provides the acquisition 
approach and describes the overall strategy for the program management team to manage 
risks to meet program goals.  The Acquisition Strategy is required by regulation for 
Milestone B and beyond.  This document was commented on by all of the respondents 
that it met its purpose.  Additionally, nine made comments indicated that this document 
provided essential knowledge in making decisions.  This document is aligned with 
Knowledge Point 3: Design can be produced within cost, schedule, and quality targets.  
Table 25 gives the assessment score for the Acquisition Strategy. 
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Table 25.  Acquisition Strategy Knowledge Assessment 
 
 
 
Technology Development Strategy 
The TDS, which is required by statute, is the document that guides acquisition 
efforts in the Technology Development phase.  Its function is very similar to the 
Acquisition Strategy.  All 12 respondents offered indications that it met its intent in 
supporting the decision-making process.  Additionally, seven of the respondents stated 
that TDS should be updated more frequently within the Technology Development stage.  
Four of the seven reasoned that if a technology is proven to be not mature enough to meet 
cost and schedule parameters, then tradeoffs need to be made as soon as possible to avoid 
cost and schedule overruns.  The TDS supports Knowledge Point 1: Requirements and 
Technology Capability are matched.  Table 26 shows the assessment for this knowledge 
area. 
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Table 26.  Technology Development Strategy Knowledge Assessment 
 
 
 
Acquisition Program Baseline 
 The next assessed document which supports the program strategy knowledge area 
is the Acquisition Program Baseline (APB).  The establishment of program goals is 
required by statute beginning at Milestone B.  The purpose of the APB is to document 
program goals in terms of cost, schedule, and technical performance.  These goals are 
made of up of an objective value and a threshold value for each Key Performance 
Parameter (KPP) or Key System Attribute (KSA).  Eleven of the 12 respondents 
commenting on the APB indicated that it added value to the decision-making process, 
thus meeting its intent.  Nine respondents made comments that the APB is needed to 
make decisions.  The APB is aligned with Knowledge Point 3: Design can be produced 
within cost, schedule, and quality targets.  Table 27 provides the assessment score for the 
APB. 
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Table 27.  Acquisition Program Baseline Knowledge Assessment 
 
 
 
Life Cycle Support Plan 
 The last document supporting the program strategy area is the Life Cycle Support 
Plan (LCSP).  The LCSP documents the program’s strategy to achieving performance-
oriented product support capability.  The LCSP is required by DoD Directive 5000.01 to 
“implement performance-based logistics strategies that optimize total system availability 
while minimizing cost and logistics footprint.”  Although life-cycle sustainment planning 
begins earlier in the acquisition process, the LCSP is mandated by Milestone B.   
The LCSP was commented on by 11 of the respondents, indicating that it met its 
intent.  Eight stated that the LCSP contained information that could be useful in making 
decisions.  However, three acknowledged that the information in the LCSP was actually 
seldom used to make decisions.  Four of the respondents made statements suggesting that 
logistical planning should play a larger role in the overall acquisition strategy for 
programs.  However, they felt that the acquisition community lacks the right skills to 
effectively plan for logistical activities.  This decision support document does not directly 
align with any of the GAO Knowledge Points.  Table 28 shows the assessment for the 
LCSP. 
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Table 28.  Life Cycle Support Plan Knowledge Assessment 
 
 
 
Overall Assessment of Knowledge Areas 
 
The last step in using the model is to assess each knowledge area based on the 
individual decision support products.  This research used a quantitative method by 
averaging the individual scores of the decision support products.  Table 29 shows the 
assessment results. 
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      Table 29.  Assessment of Knowledge Areas 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
61 
 
 
 
Chapter V.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
Cost overruns and schedule delays have plagued Major Defense Acquisition 
Programs (MDAPs) within the Department of Defense (DoD) for decades.  There are 
several factors that impact an acquisition program’s performance, including the decisions 
made by defense officials.  This research focused on one aspect of decision-making: 
knowledge support.  Secondary interview data, assessments of knowledge support 
documents, and how these documents align with best practices for knowledge-based 
decision-making helped address the investigative questions posed by this research.   
 
Results 
 
 This research posed four investigative questions.  By exploring previous research, 
gathering and analyzing data, and drawing conclusions, this research has answered those 
questions.  The research outcomes are presented for each question. 
What are the critical pieces of information that are required for an informed decision at 
key decision points in the acquisition process? 
 
The research answered this investigative question by establishing which 
documents were needed to make decisions.  The required information, according to the 
respondents, was considered to be stated in products that adequately addressed one of six 
key knowledge areas of an acquisition program:  Requirements, Cost, Schedule, 
Technical Performance, Funding, and Strategy.  This research focused on 17 decision 
support documents that directly supported these knowledge areas.  However, based on the 
feedback from respondents, two documents were eliminated.  The Milestone Decision 
62 
 
 
Authority (MDA) Certification and the Consideration for Technology Issues were not 
considered value-added to the decision-making process.  Table 30 shows the list of 
critical decision support products.   
 
                                  Table 30.  Critical Decision Support Products 
 
 
 
How does the currently available information (contained in required decision products) 
compare to what is needed for decisions with regard to technology, design, and 
production knowledge for each of the key decision points in the acquisition process? 
 
 This investigative question dealt with the alignment of the DoD acquisition 
process with best practices identified by the General Accounting Office (GAO) (2008).  
The research indicated that there is in fact an alignment of knowledge mandated with the 
GAO Knowledge Points.  For every Knowledge Point, there are decision support 
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products required by law or regulation aligned to it.  Additionally, this research has 
concluded that alignment with this best practice has not always translated into better 
program performance.     
Best practices in decision support outside of the knowledge products should also 
be considered.  For example, one metric the GAO uses to assess program knowledge is 
the average percent of design drawings completed by the Critical Design Review.  
Although readily available, this data is not required by statute or regulation for any 
decision support product.  Since the format of most required documents is not dictated, it 
is possible that this data is captured.  Therefore, the alignment of the knowledge cannot 
be determined conclusively.   
What is the effect of lack of key information on DoD acquisition programs?   
This research defined key information on DoD acquisition programs in two ways.  
The first were the instances in which key information is defined by best practices.  As 
previously mentioned, the GAO (2008) uses metrics to assess program knowledge.  As 
such, knowledge supporting these metrics can be considered key information per best 
practices.  However, this research did not specifically address the alignment of decision 
support documents and the information supporting the metrics.  Therefore, the effect of 
the lack of key information supporting the GAO metrics is unknown.   
The second definition of key information is the knowledge contained in decision 
support products determined by decision-makers as being needed to make decisions.  In 
this regard, if key information is missing, then the effect is simply that decision-makers 
cannot make a well-informed decision.  As an example, the research identified the Scope 
Evolution Document as key missing information.  At least one comment from the 
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respondents indicated that information in this document could be used to make better 
decisions regarding tradeoffs in terms of cost, schedule, and technical performance.      
Can this effect be quantified in terms of program cost, schedule, and technical 
performance? 
It is not clear if missing information can be quantified in terms of cost, schedule, 
and technical performance as there are so many factors that impact these program 
parameters.  The literature review did reveal that National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) implemented policy supporting the GAO’s best practices in 
knowledge-based decision-making and the results showed there were no improvements in 
cost and schedule for those projects.   
 
Recommendations 
 
Based on the information that has been reviewed, it is possible to make several 
recommendations to improve the use of knowledge-based decision-making in DoD 
acquisitions.  These recommendations are based directly on the information obtained 
from the participants completing the surveys used in this study, as well as from the 
information obtained by reviewing literature.  It is important to note that these 
recommendations are not intended to imply that the DoD acquisition process is 
completely inefficient or should be completely changed.  Instead, these recommendations 
are made as a way to improve the decision-making process and to bring about greater 
efficiency in the work that is done to acquire new systems for the DoD by its acquisition 
teams, suppliers, and other stakeholders. 
Recommendation #1 
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 The first recommendation is to further this study by exploring ways to improve 
the score of the knowledge areas.  This can be accomplishing by focusing on the drivers 
for the low scores for decision support products.  For example, the Non-Advocate Cost 
Assessment (NACA) scored well in all areas with the exception of it not being mandatory 
for major reviews.  In this case, it means that it is considered valuable for decision-
makers but it has not been mandated.  By mandating this knowledge product, it ensures 
that all decision-makers will have access to valuable knowledge when making decisions. 
Recommendation #2 
 The second recommendation is to use specific program metrics at reviews to 
support decisions.  For example, one metric the GAO recommends for the Critical Design 
Review is the percentage of design drawings that are complete.  This metric captures the 
stability of the design.  The literature review indicated that the higher the percentage of 
drawings that are complete, the higher the probability of the design being capable of 
meeting performance requirements.  Additionally, a stable design in the early stages of 
the development cycle reduces the risk of design changes.  The respondents to the survey 
also recommend another metric:  changes in requirements (Scope Evolution).  This 
metric captures the stability of requirements, which helps keeps cost and schedule within 
goals.   
Recommendation #3 
The next recommendation is that decision authorities should have more freedom 
to request specific types of decision products.  Aside from the decision products that are 
required by statute and regulation, decision authorities should have the freedom to 
request additional decision products when they believe that the information contained in 
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those products would be useful for a key decision.  This freedom to have access to 
additional decision products, or even decision products that are not routinely used or 
made available to acquisition teams, would help to overcome the feelings that exist about 
the lack of information when making a major decision for a program. 
 In addition to the decision authority, allowing other functional members of the 
review board to specify decision products would also be of benefit.  Rather than decision 
products being shared between stakeholders that are viewed as being useless and not even 
being thoroughly read, or even read at all, the ability to request specific decision products 
would likely result in all stakeholders taking the documents that they receive more 
seriously and using the information contained in those products in a more efficient 
manner. 
Recommendation #4 
 The next recommendation is to mandate a template for use during decision 
briefings of major milestones.  This template would contain a specific recommendation 
for the milestone decision supported by knowledge within the mandated knowledge 
support product.  For example, the senior engineering functional would make a specific 
recommendation to the decision authority with regard to technical performance.  This 
recommendation would be based on the knowledge gained from documents like the 
Systems Engineering Plan and Independent Technology Readiness Document.  This 
would accomplish two important tasks.  First, it would ensure the decisions are being 
based on knowledge that is available and that mandated knowledge products are being 
reviewed.   Secondly, it would ensure that the decision support product is being 
thoroughly reviewed for knowledge that can be used to make program decisions. 
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Recommendation #5 
Finally, it is recommended that the DoD create a standardized means by which 
decision products across the department can be created and stored for use by all 
programs, regardless of Acquisition Category (ACAT) level.  One of the issues raised by 
data collected from the participants in this study is that there is no standardized means by 
which to create and store decision products.  Instead, information is simply received and 
stored in whatever way a specific team member may believe is best.  This creates a 
situation where efficiencies cannot be realized because programs are unable to share 
information used to make decisions.     
 The creation or adoption of a single Information Technology system to 
standardize the process of creating and storing decision products would help make the 
use of decision products more engrained in the culture of the DoD.  Having a 
standardized process to handle decision products would be an indication to acquisition 
teams that decision products are no longer viewed as something that can be read and then 
forgotten about in the future.  Instead, decision products could be collected and team 
members could easily access the information contained in those products and gain a 
feeling that the products are genuinely important and should be taken seriously. 
 
Limitations 
 
As with any research effort, this effort has limitations.  The respondents to the survey 
represented only the service’s acquisition community.  Secondly, there is little 
established research in this area.  As such, the researcher does not have a point of 
reference for the findings.  Additionally, since some data sets were limited to the Air 
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Force, the findings may not be applicable to other organizations within the DoD.  
Another limitation is the fact that the researcher had to interpret the meaning of some 
responses.  This involved a combination of deductive and inductive analysis, which may 
or may not have led to the true meaning of the submission by the individuals surveyed.  
The final limitation is the aforementioned sample size of 12.  Statistically, it is not a 
significant number, but it represents a significant portion of the milestone decision 
authorities for the Air Force.   
 
Summary 
 
Decision-making for acquisition programs is very important.  The decisions that 
are made not only affect the performance of a program but could also impact the lives of 
Airman, Soldiers, Sailors, and Marines protecting our country.  Analyzing the decision 
support products is one method to improve the knowledge that is used to make decisions.  
If these recommendations are put into place, the researcher believes that the acquisitions 
process within the DoD would indeed be improved.  While these recommendations may 
seem relatively simplistic, they are based on actual issues that have been addressed by 
active members of Air Force acquisition teams.  By working to improve the efficiency of 
the decision-making process, it will lead to better decisions for programs.   
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Appendix A: Statutory Requirements for Milestone A 
 
 
INFORMATION REQUIRED FOR 
MILESTONE A  
APPLICABLE STATUTE, POLICY, AND 
OTHER REFERENCES  
Analysis of Alternatives  Subtitle III of title 40, U.S.C. 
Section 2366a of Title 10, U.S.C.  
Clinger-Cohen Act Compliance  
(All IT–including National 
Security Systems (NSS))  
Subtitle III of title 40, U.S.C.  
Consideration of Technology 
Issues  
Paragraph (b)(5) of Section 2364 of Title 
10, U.S.C.  
Cooperative Opportunities 
(part of TDS)  
Paragraph (e) of Section 2350a of Title 10, 
U.S.C.  
Data Management Strategy  
(part of TDS)  
Section 2320 of Title 10, U.S.C.  
Independent Cost Estimate  Section 2434 of Title 10, U.S.C.  
Market Research  Section 2377 of Title 10, U.S.C. 
Paragraph (e)(2) of Section 644 of title 15, 
U.S.C.  
Milestone Decision Authority 
Program Certification  
Section 2366a of Title 10, U.S.C.  
DoD Instruction 5000.02  
Submission of a DD Form 1494 
and Certification of Spectrum 
Support  
 
Sections 305 and 901 through 904 of title 
47, U.S.C.  
Section 104 of P.L. 102-538  
Part 2 of OMB Circular A-11  
Technology Development Strategy Section 803 of Public Law 107-314  
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Appendix B: Regulatory Requirements for Milestone A 
 
 
INFORMATION REQUIRED 
FOR MILESTONE B 
APPLICABLE REGULATION, 
POLICY, AND OTHER 
REFERENCES 
Acquisition Decision 
Memorandum  
DoD Instruction 5000.02  
Acquisition Information 
Assurance Strategy  (All IT–
including NSS)  
DoD Instruction 8580.1  
DoD Instruction 5000.02  
DoD Component Cost Estimate 
(as required by Component 
Acquisition Executive for MDAP) 
DoD Instruction 5000.02  
Exit Criteria  DoD Instruction 5000.02  
Initial Capabilities Document  CJCS Instruction 3170.01  
Item Unique Identification 
Implementation Plan  
DoD Instruction 8320.04  
Life-Cycle Signature Support Plan DoD Directive 5250.01  
Net-Centric Data Strategy 
(Approach summarized in TDS)  
DoD Directive 8320.02  
Program Protection Plan   DoD Instruction 5200.39  
Systems Engineering Plan  DoD Instruction 5000.02  
Test and Evaluation Strategy  DoD Instruction 5000.02  
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Appendix C: Statutory Requirements for Milestone B 
 
 
INFORMATION REQUIRED 
FOR MILESTONE B  
APPLICABLE STATUTE, POLICY, 
AND OTHER REFERENCES  
Acquisition Program Baseline 
(APB)  
Section 2435 of title 10, U.S.C.  
Alternate Live Fire Test and 
Evaluation (LFT&E) Plan  
Section 2366 of title 10, U.S.C.  
Analysis of Alternatives  Subtitle III of title 40, U.S.C. 
Section 2366a of title 10, U.S.C.  
Benefit Analysis and 
Determination  
Paragraph (e) of Section 644 of title 15, 
U.S.C.  
Clinger-Cohen Act (CCA) 
Compliance 
Subtitle III of title 40, U.S.C.  
Competition Analysis 
(part of Acquisition Strategy)  
Section 2469 of title 10, U.S.C.  
Consideration of Technology 
Issues  
Paragraph (b)(5) of Section 2364 of Title 
10, U.S.C.  
Cooperative Opportunities 
(part of Acquisition Strategy)  
Paragraph (e) of Section 2350a of title 10, 
U.S.C.  
Core Logistics Analysis/Source of 
Repair Analysis (part of 
Acquisition Strategy)   
Section 2464 of title 10, U.S.C. 
Section 2466 of title 10, U.S.C.  
Data Management Strategy 
(part of Acquisition Strategy)  
Section 2320 of title 10, U.S.C.  
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Independent Cost Estimate (ICE)  Section 2434 of title 10, U.S.C.  
Industrial Base Capabilities 
Considerations  
 
Section 2440 of title 10, U.S.C.  
LFT&E Waiver from Full-up, 
System-level Testing  
Section 2366 of title 10, U.S.C.  
Low-Rate Initial Production 
Quantities  
Section 2400 of title 10, U.S.C.  
Manpower Estimate Section 2434 of title 10, U.S.C.  
Market Research  Section 2377 of Title 10, U.S.C. 
Paragraph (e)(2) of Section 644 of title 15, 
U.S.C.  
Milestone Decision Authority 
Program Certification  
Section 2366b of title 10, U.S.C.  
DoD Instruction 5000.02  
Military Equipment Valuation Public Law 101-576, SFFAS 6  
Programmatic Environmental, 
Safety and Occupational Health 
Evaluation (PESHE)  
Sections 4321-4347 of title 42, U.S.C. 
E.O. 12114  
Replaced System Sustainment Plan Section 2437 of title 10, U.S.C.  
Selected Acquisition Report  Section 2432 of title 10, U.S.C. 
Section 2445d of title 10, U.S.C.  
Submission of a DD Form 1494 
and Certification of Spectrum 
Support 
 
Sections 305 and 901-904 of title 47, 
U.S.C. 
Section 104 of Public Law 102-538 
Part 2 of OMB Circular A-11  
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Appendix D: Regulatory Requirements for Milestone B 
 
 
INFORMATION REQUIRED FOR 
MILESTONE B  
APPLICABLE REGULATION, 
POLICY, AND OTHER 
REFERENCES  
Acquisition Decision Memorandum  DoD Instruction 5000.02  
Acquisition Information Assurance 
Strategy  
DoD Instruction 8580.1 
DoD Instruction 5000.02  
Acquisition Strategy  DoD Instruction 5000.02  
Affordability Assessment  DoD Instruction 5000.02  
Capability Development Document  CJCS Instruction 3170.01  
Chief Information Officer 
Confirmation of CCA Compliance 
DoD Instruction 5000.02  
Corrosion Plan  DoD Instruction 5000.67 
DoD Instruction 5000.02  
Cost Analysis Requirements 
Description (CARD)  
DoD Instruction 5000.02  
Defense Acquisition Executive 
Summary  
DoD Instruction 5000.02  
DoD Component Cost Estimate  DoD Instruction 5000.02  
Exit Criteria  DoD Instruction 5000.02  
Technology Readiness Assessment  
 
DoD Instruction 5000.02  
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Information Support Plan (ISP) (All 
IT–including NSS)  
DoD Directive 4630.05 
DoD Instruction 4630.8  
Initial Capabilities Document  CJCS Instruction 3170.01  
Item Unique Identification 
Implementation Plan  
DoD Instruction 8320.04  
Life-Cycle Signature Support Plan  DoD Directive 5250.01  
Life-Cycle Sustainment Plan 
(part of Acquisition Strategy)  
DoD Instruction 5000.02  
Net-Centric Data Strategy (Approach 
detailed in ISP)  
DoD Directive 8320.02  
Operational Test Agency Report of 
Operational Test and Evaluation 
Results  
DoD Instruction 5000.02  
Preliminary Design Review Report  DoD Instruction 5000.02  
Program Protection Plan  DoD Instruction 5200.39  
Spectrum Supportability 
Determination  
DoD Directive 4650.1  
System Threat Assessment Report 
(STAR)  
DoD Instruction 5000.02 
DoD Directive 5105.21 
Systems Engineering Plan  DoD Instruction 5000.02  
Technology Readiness Assessment  DoD Instruction 5000.02  
Test and Evaluation Master Plan  DoD Instruction 5000.02  
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Appendix E: Statutory Requirements for Milestone C 
 
INFORMATION REQUIRED 
FOR MILESTONE C  
APPLICABLE STATUTE, POLICY, 
AND OTHER REFERENCES  
Acquisition Program Baseline 
(APB)  
Section 2435 of title 10, U.S.C.  
Analysis of Alternatives  Subtitle III of title 40, U.S.C. 
Section 2366a of title 10, U.S.C.  
Benefit Analysis and 
Determination  (applicable to 
bundled acquisitions only if no MS 
B)) (part of Acquisition Strategy)  
Paragraph (e) of Section 644 of title 15, 
U.S.C.  
Clinger-Cohen Act (CCA) 
Compliance 
(All IT–including National 
Security Systems (NSS))  
Subtitle III of title 40, U.S.C.  
Competition Analysis 
(Depot-level Maintenance $3M 
rule)  
(part of Acquisition Strategy)  
(If No MS B)  
Section 2469 of title 10, U.S.C.  
Consideration of Technology 
Issues  
Paragraph (b)(5) of Section 2364 of Title 
10, U.S.C.  
Cooperative Opportunities 
(part of Acquisition Strategy)  
Paragraph (e) of Section 2350a of title 10, 
U.S.C.  
Core Logistics Analysis/Source of 
Repair Analysis  (part of 
Acquisition Strategy)  
Section 2464 of title 10, U.S.C. 
Section 2466 of title 10, U.S.C.  
Data Management Strategy Section 2320 of title 10, U.S.C.  
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Independent Cost Estimate (ICE) Section 2434 of title 10, U.S.C.  
Industrial Base Capabilities 
Considerations  
(part of Acquisition Strategy)  
Section 2440 of title 10, U.S.C.  
Manpower Estimate (reviewed by 
the office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Personnel and 
Readiness)  
Section 2434 of title 10, U.S.C.  
Milestone Decision Authority 
Program Certification (If Program 
Initiation)  
Section 2366a of title 10, U.S.C. 
Section 2366b of title 10, U.S.C.  
DoD Instruction 5000.02  
Military Equipment Valuation 
(part of Acquisition Strategy)  
Public Law 101-576 
Statement of Federal Financial Accounting 
Standards No. 6  
Programmatic Environmental, 
Safety and Occupational Health 
Evaluation (PESHE) (Including 
National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) / Executive Order (E.O.) 
12114  Compliance Schedule)  
Sections 4321-4347 of title 42, U.S.C. 
E.O. 12114  
Submission of a DD Form 1494 
and Certification of Spectrum 
Support 
(applicable to all 
systems/equipment that use the 
electromagnetic spectrum while 
operating in the U.S. and its 
possessions)  
Sections 305 and 901-904 of title 47, 
U.S.C. 
Section 104 of Public Law 102-538 
Part 2 of OMB Circular A-11  
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Appendix F: Regulatory Requirements for Milestone C 
 
INFORMATION REQUIRED 
FOR MILESTONE C 
APPLICABLE REGULATION, 
POLICY, AND OTHER 
REFERENCES  
Acquisition Decision 
Memorandum  
DoD Instruction 5000.02  
Acquisition Information Assurance 
Strategy (All IT–including 
National Security Systems (NSS)) 
DoD Instruction 8580.1 
DoD Instruction 5000.02  
Acquisition Strategy  DoD Instruction 5000.02  
Affordability Assessment  DoD Instruction 5000.02  
Capability Development Document CJCS Instruction 3170.01  
Chief Information Officer 
Confirmation of CCA Compliance
DoD Instruction 5000.02  
Corrosion Plan  DoD Instruction 5000.67 
DoD Instruction 5000.02  
Cost Analysis Requirements 
Description (CARD)  
DoD Instruction 5000.02  
Defense Acquisition Executive 
Summary  
DoD Instruction 5000.02  
DoD Component Cost Estimate  DoD Instruction 5000.02  
Exit Criteria  DoD Instruction 5000.02  
Independent Technology 
Readiness Assessment  
DoD Instruction 5000.02  
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(if required by the office of the 
Director, Defense Research and 
Engineering)  
Information Support Plan (ISP) 
(All IT–including NSS)  
DoD Directive 4630.05 
DoD Instruction 4630.8  
Initial Capabilities Document  CJCS Instruction 3170.01  
Item Unique Identification 
Implementation Plan  
DoD Instruction 8320.04  
Life-Cycle Signature Support Plan DoD Directive 5250.01  
Life-Cycle Sustainment Plan 
(part of Acquisition Strategy)  
DoD Instruction 5000.02  
Net-Centric Data Strategy 
(Approach detailed in ISP)  
DoD Directive 8320.02  
Operational Test Agency Report of 
Operational Test and Evaluation 
Results  
DoD Instruction 5000.02  
Preliminary Design Review Report DoD Instruction 5000.02  
Program Protection Plan (for 
programs with critical program 
information) (includes Anti-
Tamper Annex) (also summarized 
in the Acquisition Strategy)  
DoD Instruction 5200.39  
Spectrum Supportability 
Determination (applicable to all 
systems/equipment that use the 
electromagnetic spectrum in the 
U.S. and in other host nations)  
DoD Directive 4650.1  
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System Threat Assessment Report 
(STAR)  
- validated by Defense Intelligence 
Agency (DIA) for ACAT ID 
programs) 
- validated by DoD Components 
for ACAT IC programs 
- Programs on the DOT&E 
Oversight List require a STAR 
regardless of ACAT designation  
DoD Instruction 5000.02 
DoD Directive 5105.21 
DIA Directive 5000.200 
DIA Instruction 5000.002  
Systems Engineering Plan  DoD Instruction 5000.02  
Technology Readiness Assessment DoD Instruction 5000.02  
Test and Evaluation Master Plan  DoD Instruction 5000.02 
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Appendix G: Questionnaire 
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